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 COMMENT 
Picking Cotton for Pennies: An 
Exploration into the Law’s Modern 
Endorsement of a Free-Prison 
Workforce 
Renee Elaine Henson* 
ABSTRACT 
The Thirteenth Amendment made slavery unconstitutional, but also cre-
ated an exception where “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.” This carve-out opened the door for prison-dependent com-
panies to make handsome profits from large scale prison labor. Inmates 
must work full time in demanding conditions, and are paid nominally in 
return. Inmates do not receive minimum wages because they are excluded 
from the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) through 
judicial interpretation. Low wages harm inmates because there are costs to 
imprisonment; inmates are charged for personal hygiene products, health 
services, per diem fees, prescriptions, police booking, probation, DNA 
testing, police transportation, phone calls, public defender services, and 
visitations. Inmates and their families cannot afford the exorbitant costs of 
imprisonment. This article argues that courts’ holdings that inmates have 
no right to freely sell their labor, should change because one’s labor should 
always belong to his or herself. The FLSA was meant to protect against 
low-wage harms, and courts should reframe their analysis to better address 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: JACKSON’S STORY 
Meet Jackson. Jackson works almost every day of his life.  Jackson was re-
cently assigned an outdoor job to work on an actual plantation field more than 150 
years after the end of the Civil War.1 Jackson is paid $0.02 per hour, meaning Jack-
son will only receive $.16 for a full day’s work.2 Jackson does not receive the usual 
labor protections many Americans have grown accustomed to, such as: workers’ 
compensation, the ability to form a union, or the simple ability to quit.3 Jackson is 
very unhappy with his job, but as a prison inmate in America’s ever-increasing 
number of private prisons, Jackson has no legitimate way to rid himself of his un-
fortunate reality.4 
Jackson’s employers, however, appreciate Jackson’s restrictions. In fact, Jack-
son’s employers base their projected profit outcomes on there being more people 
like Jackson to fill his place once he leaves prison.5 Jackson’s employers rely on 
increasing prison populations to improve profit margins to make as much money as 
possible.6 For example, a study from Mississippi found private prisons give twice 
the amount of time-enhancing infractions to inmates as state prisons do, which al-
lows the average private prison to collect an additional $3,000 in fees from people 
like Jackson.7 Jackson’s employers make tremendous profits off of a massive labor 
force where there are no additional expenditures for healthcare, no concern for un-
employment, workers do not have to be paid, and performance is virtually guaran-
teed.8 
There are substantial profits to be earned on the backs of prison inmates.9 Part 
II of this article shows how the law endorses and allows private companies to capi-
talize on prisoners who do not have employee status. Beginning after the Civil War 
and during the Reconstruction Era, the Black Codes were created in the South 
around 1865.10 The Black Codes were race-neutral on their face, but had the dele-
terious effect of returning recently-freed slaves into a position of subjugation in 
order to capitalize on cheap labor.11 While the Black Codes were first introduced in 
Mississippi and South Carolina, virtually all other southern states followed suit and 
                                                          
 1. Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex, HIST. IS WEAPON, 
http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/davisprison.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); see also Benns, 
supra note 1. 
 4. Emily Jane Perkins, Regulating Appearance In The Workplace: An Employer’s Guide To Avoid 
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.natlawre-
view.com/article/regulating-appearance-workplace-employer-s-guide-to-avoid-employment-discrimi-
nation (this introduction style was borrowed from the above article.). 
 5. Geiza Vargas-Vargas, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 41, 76 
(2005). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gabrielle Canon, Here’s the Latest Evidence of How Private Prisons Are Exploiting Inmates for 
Profit, MOTHER JONES (June 17, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/06/private-prisons-
profit. 
 8. Davis, supra note 3; see also Benns, supra note 1. 
 9. Davis, supra note 3. 
 10. Chris Weaver & Will Purcell, The Prison Industrial Complex: A Modern Justification for African 
Enslavement?, 41 HOW. L. J. 349, 354 (1998). 
 11. Id. 
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enacted their own Black Codes under President Andrew Johnson’s lenient Recon-
struction policies.12 These Black Codes were well-supported until 1877.13 This sec-
tion shows how, similar to the Black Codes, there is a larger scaled exploitation that 
still occurs, now under the Thirteenth Amendment, which states that “[n]either slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.”14 Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception to 
slavery and involuntary servitude opened the door for prison-dependent companies 
to make money off prison labor on a large scale.15 
Constitutionally protected, cheap prison labor is a treasure trove for companies, 
but an injustice for inmate workers. Part III will explain why forced, low-wage 
prison labor is a problem, and the difficulties that exploited prisoners may face. 
Prisons commonly charge inmates for necessary personal items like toilet paper, 
meals, and clothes.16 For example, at Attica State Correctional Facility in Califor-
nia, workers are paid between $0.06 and $0.29 per day, and struggle to afford toilet 
paper in the prison commissary.17 Because prison fees for basic necessities abound, 
prisoners’ family members often have to pay these costs; however, because this 
causes economic stress on families, many prisoners go without necessary personal 
hygiene products.18 
There should be a change in how courts read the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”). Part IV proposes a legal solution for inmates to receive protection under 
the FLSA. This section will discuss how the national economy is affected by prison 
labor, as well as families who have loved ones imprisoned. As Martin Luther King 
Jr. famously said in his Letter From Birmingham Jail, “there are two types of laws: 
there are just laws, and there are unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that 
‘[a]n unjust law is no law at all.’”19 Because prisoners are not considered employees 
under the FLSA, they receive very few protections from what many consider to be 
inhumane labor standards.20 
It is unjust when a prisoner is forced to work as a miner, and if not, face the 
extreme punishment of solitary confinement.21 Solitary confinement makes prison-
ers more dangerous because it may cause the following: “[a] specific psychiatric 
syndrome, characterized by hallucinations; panic attacks; overt paranoia; dimin-
ished impulse control; hypersensitivity to external stimuli; and difficulties with 
                                                          
 12. Black Codes, HIST. (Mar. 12, 2017), http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/black-codes. 
 13. Id. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 15. Weaver & Purcell, supra note 10, at 360. 
 16. Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Vi-
olate the Excessive Fines Clause, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 31, 2014), https://www.brennan-
center.org/analysis/paying-your-time-how-charging-inmates-fees-behind-bars-may-violate-excessive-
fines-clause. 
 17. Heather Ann Thompson, Rethinking Working-Class Struggle through the Lens of the Carceral 
State: Toward a Labor History of Inmates and Guards, 8 LAB.: STUD. WORKING-CLASS HIST. AM. 3, 22 
(2011), http://havenscenter.wisc.edu/files/Thompson.laborinmatesandguards.pdf. 
 18. Eisen, supra note 16. 
 19. Martin Luther King Jr., Martin Luther King Jr.’s ‘Letter From Birmingham Jail’, ATLANTIC (Aug. 
1, 1963), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/martin-luther-kings-letter-from-bir-
mingham-jail/274668/. 
 20. Benns, supra note 1. 
 21. Id. 
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thinking, concentration and memory.”22 Solitary confinement is a harsh conse-
quence for taking a personal day. Also, profits from a prisoner’s toil do not usually 
go back to the state to help pay the exorbitant costs of keeping him or her impris-
oned, but instead go towards increasing corporations’ profits.23 Private prisons com-
prise a significant portion of combined state and federal prisons. For-profit prisons 
make up 7% of state prisons, and 18% of federal prisons.24 Private prisons also 
make up 75% of federal immigrant detention facilities.25 Is this a system of laws 
that Martin Luther King Jr. would have considered just? 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF A STATE-ENDORSED PRISON SYSTEM THAT PERMITS 
FREE LABOR 
This section will discuss how the law endorses the for-profit incarceration of 
Americans. The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to free black men and women 
in America, but the Black Codes, Jim Crow laws, and the “war on drugs” have 
placed more black Americans in the prison system than there were in the days of 
slavery.26 This section will show some of the ways that for-profit prisons affect 
inmates’ day-to-day lives, and how the FLSA unfairly treats inmates.27 
A. The Circularity of American Jurisprudence 
The problem of inmate profiteering cannot properly be analyzed without first 
discussing the overrepresentation of black men in prison, and how that connects to 
the post-Civil War creation of the Black Codes.28 The Black Codes were facially 
race-neutral, but disproportionately affected blacks, mostly in the American 
South.29 The Black Codes consisted of five major legislative categories: “(1) va-
grancy laws, (2) contract-enforcement laws, (3) enticement laws, (4) criminal-
surety [laws], and (5) [] convict-leasing system [laws].”30 The purpose of the Black 
Codes was to place recently-freed slaves back into the position of providing free, 
forced labor.31 Although they did not specifically name blacks, the Black Codes 
worked as a tool for ensuring the inferiority of the newly freed slaves by using fa-
cially benign statutes as “a pretext to maintain control over the freedmen.”32 The 
                                                          
 22. Jason Breslow, What Does Solitary Confinement Do To Your Mind?, FRONTLINE (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-does-solitary-confinement-do-to-your-mind/. 
 23. Davis, supra note 3. 
 24. Private Prisons, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration/privatization-criminal-
justice/private-prisons (last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Katie Mulvaney, More African-American men in prison system now than were enslaved in 1850, 
POLITIFACT (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.politifact.com/rhode-island/statements/2014/dec/07/diego-
arene-morley/brown-u-student-leader-more-african-american-men-p/; see also Max Ehrenfreund, 
There’s a disturbing truth to John Legend’s Oscar statement about prisons and slavery, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/23/theres-a-disturbing-
truth-to-john-legends-oscar-statement-about-prisons-and-slavery/?utm_term=.a9356d1eda30. 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 
 28. Weaver & Purcell, supra note 10, at 351. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 354. 
 31. Id. 
 32. William M. Carter, A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 65 (2004). 
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Black Codes had a resoundingly greater effect on black men than on any others in 
society, but because the Black Codes were facially neutral, there was no legal cause 
of action.33 
Although the Black Codes are no longer in force today, there is another law in 
force that, while purportedly protecting from racial discrimination, actually contrib-
utes to the modern condition of prisons — the Thirteenth Amendment.34 While a 
fair reading of the Thirteenth Amendment would indicate that the spirit of the law 
was within the context of the Reconstruction Amendments’ broad purpose of elim-
inating racial subjugation,35 it is worth exploring how America’s prison systems 
criminally supervise more black men today than were enslaved in 1850.36 
The Census of 1850 showed there were 872,924 African American slaves over 
the age of 15 in the United States.37 In 2013, there were 526,000 African Americans 
in State and Federal Correctional Centers; during the same year there were 877,000 
African American men on probation, and 280,000 African American men on pa-
role.38 These figures total 1.68 million African American men under State and Fed-
eral criminal justice supervision.39 Further, because more black men are affected by 
the criminal justice system now than were by slavery, more black men are disen-
franchised by state laws prohibiting felons from voting than were barred from the 
ballot box in 1870.40 
The modern criminal justice system is largely a result of President Ronald 
Reagan’s escalation of the war on crime and drugs.41 Although crime is interracial, 
the zero-tolerance drug policies that created mandatory minimum sentences had a 
disproportionately harmful effect on the black community.42 Take for example the 
oft repeated sentencing scheme that created a punishment disparity of 100:1 from 
crack cocaine to powder cocaine — the former mostly affecting blacks, and the 
latter mostly affecting whites.43 A 100:1 punishment disparity — all for different 
drug classifications based on substances that are molecularly identical.44 This meant 
that a black man sentenced for a non-violent crack conviction spent about the same 
amount of time in prison as a white man for a violent conviction.45 Thankfully, that 
shocking disparity is now almost behind us as a nation; the disparity as of 2010 was 
only 18:1, which, while still unpardonably high, is much lower than it was in the 
1980s.46 
                                                          
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the Counter-Majoritarian Eighth 
Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1156 (2014). 
 36. Ehrenfreund, supra note 26. 
 37. Mulvaney, supra note 26. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.huff-
ingtonpost.com/michelle-alexander/the-new-jim-crow_b_454469.html. 
 41. Otis B. Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of Jury 
Nullification, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L. J. 145, 152 (2004). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Fair Sentencing Act, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/feature/fair-sentencing-act (last visited Mar. 
22, 2018). 
 44. Elizabeth Kulze, How Crack Vs. Coke Sentencing Unfairly Targets Poor People, VOCATIV (Feb. 
22, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/underworld/drugs/crack-vs-coke-sentencing/. 
 45. Fair Sentencing Act, supra note 43. 
 46. Id. 
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Although the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified over 100 years ago, and the 
Black Codes and Jim Crow laws are relics of the past, the modern criminal justice 
system is taxing the black community in ways that are strikingly similar to pre-
Thirteenth Amendment days.47 Professor Otis Grant, Director of the Institute for the 
Study of Race, argued that “racism in the modern criminal justice system is subtle 
and, as such, harder to confront while being just as psychologically damaging.”48 
Analyzing the numbers alone shows the unfortunate circularity of the subjugation 
of blacks through the legal system. 
B. The Irony of the Thirteenth Amendment 
In an ironic turn of history, the Thirteenth Amendment simultaneously made it 
illegal to own slaves, but made an exception for involuntary servitude where a per-
son has been convicted of a crime: “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”49 Be-
cause of this dramatic exception, inmates, who are disproportionately black men, 
are legally approved modern slaves.50 Studies have shown that even though black 
people make up only 12% of the overall U.S. population, they make up 30% of 
those charged with property offenses, 38% of those charged with violent arrests, 
and one in three black men born in 2001 will go to prison at some point in his 
lifespan.51 Thus, many black prisoners are forced to perform hard labor without any 
constitutional remedy.52 
For example, Missouri statutorily mandates offenders to work, allowing for an 
exception only if the offender establishes an approved reason not to work.53 The 
Chief Administrative Officer of Missouri must approve that reason, as set forth in 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.337.54 Section 217.337 says, in relevant parts, that “[a]ll gen-
eral population offenders shall be expected to adhere to a schedule of activities of 
work and rehabilitative programs as prescribed for the offender by the depart-
ment.”55 Missouri courts have held that the Department of Corrections has broad 
discretion in deciding what type of job or program the offender will receive.56 Pris-
oners across the nation do jobs that run the gamut: they make uniforms, bedding, 
shoes, and surge protectors; transcribe books into Braille format; pick oranges, plant 
trees, and make fiberglass canoes; are telemarketers; and even make paper targets 
                                                          
 47. See supra Part A, page 8 (The Circularity of American Jurisprudence). 
 48. Grant, supra note 41, at 186. 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 50. Benns, supra note 1. 
 51. Shadow Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice 
System, SENT’G PROJECT (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/shadow-re-
port-to-the-united-nations-human-rights-committee-regarding-racial-disparities-in-the-united-states-
criminal-justice-system/. 
 52. Id. 
 53. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.337 (2017); see also Reynolds v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 468 S.W.3d 
413 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 54. § 217.337. 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. Oldcroft v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 4:12-CV-66-DDN, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50796, at 
*8–9 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 11, 2012). 
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for law enforcement officials to practice marksmanship — all for almost no pay.57 
For example, Missouri Vocational Enterprises Correctional Industries provides a 
catalogue showcasing all the products made by inmates, including: American flags; 
office and bedroom furniture; institutional products for prisons; police uniforms; 
chair swings; and all manner of the University of Missouri-themed products.58 
Some states do not pay inmates any wages at all, including Texas, Arkansas, 
and Georgia.59 The Texas Department of Criminal Justice says prisoners must either 
work or face extreme consequences.60 Consequences may include the following: 
loss of privileges; forced confinement in cells for 24 hours a day with “no trips to 
the day room, commissary, or recreation yard”; forced solitary meals in cells; or 
removal of all prisoner property from cells during the time of punishment — all a 
very steep price to pay for not showing up to work.61 Further, the jobs that prisoners 
are compelled to perform are not easy by most Americans’ standards; inmates in 
Texas begin their days at 3:30 am, eat breakfast at 4:30 am, and are ready to work 
at their assigned job at 6:00 am, all for no pay.62 
The Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery, but it also created an exception 
which in another, subtler way, has swallowed the law. In addition to several states 
paying prisoners nothing at all, some require prisoners to do work that still reflects 
the realities of the late 1860s.63 Florida, Ohio, Washington, and Massachusetts all 
use chain gangs in some capacity.64 In Florida, prisoners are paraded around the 
community with chains around their ankles, in black and white striped uniforms, 
wearing florescent green vests — all to ensure a deterrent effect.65 Newly minted 
Brevard County, Florida Sheriff, Wayne Ivey, is intent on sending a strong anti-
crime, tough on punishment message, but the reminders of slavery bring forth an 
uncomfortable sense of déjà vu’: “[g]iven the connotations of slavery and forced 
labor that a chain gang brings up, it is not ideal,” said Baylor Johnson, of the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union.66 
A prison using chain gangs walks a constitutionally fine line: in Austin v. 
Hooper, the court held that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s rule 
against cruel and unusual punishment to shackle prisoners to a “hitching post” to 
coerce inmates to return to work.67 In Austin, prisoners were made to stand for hours 
at a time in one position.68 Some inmates had their arms shackled to the hitching 
                                                          
 57. Lindsay Putnam, The Seven Weirdest Jobs That Prisoners Do, N.Y. POST (June 23, 2015, 2:33 
PM), http://nypost.com/2015/06/23/the-seven-weirdest-jobs-that-prisoners-do/. 
 58. Missouri Vocational Enterprises Correctional Industries, https://doc.mo.gov/mve/ (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2018). 
 59. Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, Why Prisoners Across the Country Have Gone on Strike, MOTHER 
JONES (Sept. 19, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/prison-strike-inmate-
labor-work. 
 60. Frequently Asked Questions, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.texas.gov/faq/cid.html 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Andrew Ford, Florida sheriff reintroduces chain gang, USA TODAY (May 2, 2013, 4:22 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/02/brevard-county-sheriff-chain-gang/2130335/. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
 68. Id. 
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post which caused pain, discomfort, chaffing, and the heat of the shackles burned 
the prisoners.69 
Florida’s Sheriff Ivey has addressed the potential unconstitutionality of using 
chain gangs by shackling inmates’ ankles together, but not to a post, or to other 
inmates.70 Ivey emphasizes the inmates who work the chain gangs volunteer for this 
particular work, and “enjoy the sunshine and the fresh air.”71 Although some sher-
iffs place a positive spin on the benefits of chain gang work for eight hours a day, 
six days a week, this spin is belied by the use of different names such as “tandem 
work crews.”72 Calling a 130 year-old punishment by a new name may be an at-
tempt to create distance from a practice that is not a shining example of American 
history — if there is nothing wrong with the practice, why attempt to rebrand it?73 
C. Judicial Interpretation of the FLSA 
The privatization of prisons in America has created a boon for private prison 
companies and their investors.74 There are massive benefits for companies who in-
vest in private prisons because inmates are not legally considered employees under 
the FLSA.75 Companies that invest in private prison industries are relieved of many 
concerns that go along with American free enterprise: there is no concern a mis-
treated worker will go on strike; profit margins stay strong because prisoner unem-
ployment insurance is not required; work schedules always stay consistent because 
prisoners are not given vacation, compensation, or bereavement time off; and em-
ployers are not bound by minimum wage laws.76 All of the benefits listed above are 
made possible by courts holding that inmates are not included under the protection 
of the FLSA,77 even though inmates are not explicitly excluded from the Act itself.78 
The FLSA’s purpose, inter alia, is to set a minimum standard of living for 
workers that is “necessary for health, efficiency, and [the] general well-being of 
workers.”79 The FLSA guarantees a minimum wage for most workers, but sets out 
a long list of those exempted, such as: bona fide executives; employees who harvest 
or farm for any kind of fish; employees that do anything in connection with pub-
lishing a newspaper with fewer than four thousand subscriptions; employees that 
do domestic work on a casual basis; and certain types of computer analysts.80 Note 
that prisoners are not included in the list of exempt workers. However, courts and 
legislatures have read an exemption into the FLSA for prisoners, which is in direct 
conflict with the Supreme Court’s view that “[s]pecificity in stating exemptions 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 1256-57. 
 70. Ford, supra note 63. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of Slavery?, 
GLOBAL RES. (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-
big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289. 
 75. Vongkiatkajorn, supra note 59. 
 76. Pelaez, supra note 74. 
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 
 78. Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 213. 
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strengthens the implication that employees not thus exempted . . . remain within the 
Act.”81 
In a Ninth Circuit FLSA interpretation case, Hale v. Arizona, inmates sued to 
be paid the minimum wage, arguing that prisoners should be considered employees 
under the FLSA.82 The Hale court held that because prisoners were statutorily re-
quired to work under Arizona law, the economic benefit of their labor belonged to 
the institution — thus, prisoners did not deserve minimum wage because they could 
not be employees under the FLSA.83 
Although the Hale court says the FLSA may not categorically exclude all in-
mate labor, and the Supreme Court has held that the definition of employee should 
be considered broadly, the Ninth Circuit made a distinction between employees who 
have the freedom to work and those who do not.84 The court said that to determine 
whether there is a true employment relationship under the FLSA, the test requires 
the court to focus on the economic reality of the relationship, and not technical lan-
guage like the FLSA’s definitions of “employee,” “employer,” and “employ.”85 The 
court must make this distinction because if the test were measured by the “technical 
language” put forth in the Act, inmates would have to be considered employees.86 
The court explained the difference between a free person and a legally enslaved one 
is a free person’s labor is his alone to sell: “inmate labor is different from this type 
of situation where labor is exchanged for wages in a free market. Convicted crimi-
nals do not have the right freely to sell their labor and are not protected by the Thir-
teenth Amendment against involuntary servitude.”87 
Courts have concluded that because inmates must work as a part of their sen-
tences, the essence of the relationship between prison industry and prisoner is “pe-
nological and not pecuniary.”88 Courts have defended their findings that inmates are 
not employees on the legal fiction that prisoners are removed from the national 
economy when they are incarcerated, even though they substantially contribute to 
private prison companies’ profits, reaching $3 billion in 2010.89 
                                                          
 81. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950). 
 82. Hale, 993 F.2d at 1389. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1393–94. 
 85. Id. (“Employee” is defined as “any individual employed by an employer,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) 
(2018), including “any individual employed by a State,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C). “Employer” includes 
“a public agency,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). “Employ” includes “to suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 
203(g).). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. at 1394. 
 88. Id. at 1395. 
 89. Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration (last visited Mar. 26, 
2018). 
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III.  THE COMPANIES THAT PROFIT, THE WORK WITH WHICH PRISONERS 
ARE FACED, AND THE PROBLEMS THAT ARE ENCOUNTERED 
A. Private Interests and the Bottom Line 
For-profit companies are capitalizing on an almost limitless, near-free work 
force that has virtually no protections. Leading this charge is the American Legis-
lative Exchange Council (“ALEC”). ALEC is a conservative lobbying group that 
has played a large role in forming laws to bring more people into prison systems, 
including laws such as stand your ground, mandatory minimum sentences, and three 
strike laws — all of which have dramatically increased prison populations.90 ALEC 
is backed by many powerful companies — including Coca-Cola, Kraft Foods, 
Procter & Gamble, and McDonalds — who take part in actually drafting and pro-
posing major legislation.91 Although ALEC hales itself as a benign, “nonpartisan 
public-private partnership,” its primary goal is to “increase[e] corporate profits 
without public scrutiny.”92 ALEC creates handwritten, “model legislation,” that is 
later used in state legislatures nationwide.93 ALEC’s influence is so far-reaching 
that about 200 of its bills are passed into law annually.94 Wisconsin Democratic 
State Representative Mark Pocan, who is working to expose ALEC’s role in creat-
ing harsher laws, was quoted as saying, “ALEC is a corporate dating service for 
lonely legislators and corporate special interests[, and] [] eventually the relationship 
culminates with some special interest legislation . . . [u]nfortunately, what’s ex-
cluded from that equation is the public.”95 
ALEC has been instrumental in the expansion and entrenchment of private in-
dustry in the prison system by creating laws that promote privatization, intensified 
punishment, and longer prison sentences.96 Corrections Corporation of America 
(“CCA”), a large private prison corporation, had such a close affiliation with ALEC 
that CCA was present at the time ALEC member-corporations voted for S.B. 1070, 
an Arizona law that increased the undocumented immigrant population in detention 
centers and jails.97 The presence of prison representatives in the room while ALEC 
corporations vote for a law that will increase the number of future prison inmates, 
which will lead to more corporate profits, highlights a serious conflict of interests. 
Notably, CCA left ALEC when it was exposed that CCA was in the room while the 
voting of S.B. 1070 occurred.98 
                                                          
 90. Lewis Beale, ‘The 13th’: Ava DuVernay’s Damning Netflix Doc Finds the Truth About Mass In-
carceration, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 3, 2016, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/arti-
cles/2016/10/03/the-13th-ava-duvernay-s-damning-netflix-doc-finds-the-truth-about-mass-incarcera-
tion.html. 
 91. The United States of ALEC: Bill Moyers on the Secretive Corporate-Legislative Body Writing Our 
Laws, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.democra-
cynow.org/2012/9/27/the_united_states_of_alec_bill. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. How ALEC & the Kochs Publicly Back Criminal Justice Reform & Privately Expand Mass Incar-
ceration, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.democra-
cynow.org/2016/10/3/how_alec_the_kochs_publicly_back. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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A report entitled Unholy Alliance: How the Private Prison Industry is Corrupt-
ing Our Democracy and Promoting Mass Incarceration, by the Public Campaign 
and PICO National Network, said that prison population growth “[is] an intentional 
effort by the private prison industry to shape public policy to push more people into 
prison and keep them there longer. The industry has achieved this through the clas-
sic three-pronged strategy of contributing to political campaigns, lobbying, and 
gaining access to policymakers through close relationships.”99 
It is a misnomer to call what ALEC does “lobbying,” because ALEC essentially 
allows individuals who represent ALEC-affiliated-corporations to have the same 
voting power as elected legislators.100 Both legislators and lobbyists vote on pro-
posed bills written by corporate lobbyists and are later introduced in the legislature 
by those same representatives.101 It is common for lobbyists to assist the drafting of 
legislation, but there is a sharp distinction between (1) merely assisting in the draft-
ing process, and (2) writing the bills, and then gathering support from key legislators 
and affiliated corporate representatives before pushing the bill to the state legisla-
ture for a final vote.102 This distinction begs the following question: is this how most 
Americans think their state representatives consider legislation? 
B. What is the Harm Done to Prisoners? 
Not only do inmates work long hours for nominal wages, they also have to pay 
for their own imprisonment.103 There are several methods of “pay-to-stay” schemes 
that states have developed.104 The first is a per-diem fee, where inmates are charged 
each day for their stay.105 Forty-three states have authorized a per-diem fee.106 Some 
per-diem fees are steeper than others; for example, in Riverside, California, inmates 
are charged $142.42 per day, while in Franklin County, Ohio, the fee is $40 per 
day.107 A second fee scheme is charging inmates a’ la carte for necessary items and 
services.108 Items charged may include toilet paper, meals, medical and dental ser-
vices, prescriptions, police booking, probation, DNA testing, police transportation, 
phone call fees, public defender services, and visitation fees.109 
If an inmate receives only $.16 per day from his hard labor, but his daily fees 
are, even on the low end, $40.00 per day, he has no possibility of paying his com-
                                                          
 99. David Donnelly, Private Prisons Industry: Increasing Incarcerations, Maximizing Profits and Corrupt-
ing Our Democracy, HUFFINGTION POST (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-donnelly/pri-
vate-prisons_b_1097667.html. 
 100. How ALEC & the Kochs Publicly Back Criminal Justice Reform & Privately Expand Mass Incar-
ceration, supra note 96. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Tim Cansler, What Does a Lobbyist Do?, CANSLER CONSULTING (Nov. 30, 2011), http://cans-
lerconsulting.com/news/lobbyist/. 
 103. Eisen, supra note 16. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Tanzina Vega, Costly prison fees are putting inmates deep in debt, CNN MONEY (Sept. 18, 2015, 
2:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/18/news/economy/prison-fees-inmates-debt/. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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pounding debt. Charging fees is a problem not only for the inmate, but for the com-
munity as well because family members often end up paying the daily fees.110 Fur-
ther, inmates will choose to go without necessary hygiene products and medical 
procedures to avoid asking their families to pay the costs.111 Families of inmates 
spend approximately $13,607 per sentence to help the inmate with conviction-re-
lated costs.112 Almost half of these families cannot afford to pay these costs.113 Thus, 
families of inmates end up bearing much of the burden of the per-diem and a’ la 
carte fees directed at inmates, to their own detriment. 
On a macro scale, debt-saddling an inmate only adds to the difficulty of them 
successfully reintegrating and becoming productive members of society.114 Some 
of the challenges faced by inmates re-entering the community are finding employ-
ment and housing due to criminal convictions; imagine facing this reality while also 
leaving prison tens of thousands of dollars poorer.115 Dee Taylor, an inmate who 
served three years in a Florida state prison, left the state Department of Corrections 
with a $55,000 bill.116 Taylor’s debt resulted from a statutorily approved $50 per 
day fee.117 Taylor is 69 years old and his only income is from Social Security.118 
Taylor has no hope of paying the debt off and said, “I don’t have the means to fight 
it.”119 Taylor is right to recognize that he cannot afford the prison debt because So-
cial Security only provides $733 in monthly income.120 Taylor lives $3,264 below 
the poverty line and, thus, has no hope of paying a $55,000 debt.121 And, the debt 
will never disappear until paid; the state may even lay a claim to the ex-convict’s 
estate.122 
If the debt is not paid, other problems arise. Additional ramifications include 
prevention of access to housing, revocation of one’s driver’s license, and the risk of 
not ever receiving Social Security benefits.123 Further, if inmates become delinquent 
on fees, the court may issue warrants for their arrests, which, with the imposition of 
additional per-diem fees, would put them even deeper in debt.124 As a result of fees, 
and the almost certain inability to pay the fees from one’s prison job wages, the 
inmate will be financially buried in ways that seem impossible to fully escape. 
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 111. Id. 
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 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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 121. Kimberly Amadeo, Federal Poverty Level Guidelines and Chart, BALANCE (Jan. 29, 2018), 
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IV.  WHAT IS THE LEGAL SOLUTION? 
A. Inmates Add to the National Economy 
In Hale v. Arizona, the court said inmate employment does not fall under the 
umbrella of the FLSA employee-employer relationship because it is not a free labor 
situation.125 The Hale court said that inmates are not “employed” in the normal 
sense of the word because “the economic reality of the relationship between the 
worker and the entity for which work was performed lies in the relationship between 
prison and prisoner.”126 “It is penological, not pecuniary.”127 The court reasoned 
that inmates are removed from the national economy when incarcerated.128 How-
ever, in reality inmates are not removed from the national economy — they add to 
it.129 
Not only are private prison companies gaining billions in profits,130 their inves-
tors are also seeing large returns on investment — strengthening the national econ-
omy.131 Scopia Capital is a hedge fund company that is one of the largest sharehold-
ers in GEO Group, a large private prison company.132 Scopia owns $300 million in 
shares of GEO Group — representing 12% of Scopia’s total investment portfolio.133 
Scopia also manages New Jersey’s state pensions, amounting to $150 million, 
which represents a sizeable portion of the national economy.134 Further, the Van-
guard Group and Fidelity Investments, both large 401(k) providers who, combined, 
own 20% stock in CCA and the GEO Group.135 Meaning anyone in our nation look-
ing to receive, or currently receiving, retirement funds is likely receiving a direct 
benefit from private prisons and the money they generate.136 Given that all federal 
inmates are required to work, and many states have the same mandate, inmates’ 
work contributes to a greater profit,  which leads to more investors and, thus, affects 
the national economy in substantial ways.137 
The Supreme Court, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden138 
has instructed lower courts to interpret the word “employ” in the FLSA broadly, 
and to look at the “economic reality rather than ‘technical concepts.’”139 The eco-
nomic reality of inmate work is substantial because companies profit from a near-
                                                          
 125. James K. Haslam, Comment, Prison Labor Under State Direction: Do Inmates Have the Right to 
FLSA Coverage and Minimum Wage?,  1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 369, 386 (1994). 
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AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/whos-getting-rich-off-the-prison-industrial-complex. 
 130. The United States of ALEC: Bill Moyers on the Secretive Corporate-Legislative Body Writing Our 
Laws, supra note 91. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Downs, supra note 129. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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free work force.140 The Hale court counters the economic reality standard by argu-
ing that, because inmates must work, the real economic reality is that their labor 
belongs to the prison and can be “disposed of legitimately within the discretion of 
the correction facility or agency.”141 Thus, if the economic reality test were applied 
literally, as in Darden, almost all inmates would be protected under the FLSA. 
The economic reality test should mean just that. If inmates are contributing 
greatly to the larger economy, and private companies contracting with the state are 
making money, inmates should be compensated because, although they have no 
choice to work, a person’s labor is still his or her own. John Locke, a philosopher 
who had great impact on American jurisprudence, said that every man has a prop-
erty in his own person and that the right to enjoy the fruit of one’s labor is a funda-
mental right.142 Can a property interest in one’s own labor be soundly denied simply 
because he or she is forced to engage in it? 
B. By Excluding Inmates from the FLSA, Harm is Done to Fami-
lies in the Community 
One primary concern the FLSA was meant to address was employees’ sub-
standard living conditions, and a minimum wage would protect against this.143 The 
Hale court said that because inmates are under the control and protection of an in-
stitution, they are protected from the ravages of poverty because food, shelter, and 
clothing are provided.144 But by excluding inmates from the FLSA’s protections, it 
is inmates’ families — who must pay for an inmate’s clothing, shelter, and food 
during incarceration, because those necessities are not freely provided by the prison 
— who suffer the harm of decreased protections.145 
One 14-state report found that 58% of families living in poverty could not af-
ford costs associated with a loved one’s imprisonment.146 Of families that have a 
loved one in prison, 48% struggle to meet their basic family needs due to the finan-
cial costs associated with paying a loved one’s prison fees.147 Almost 20% cannot 
afford housing due to the loss of income resulting from a family member’s impris-
onment.148 However, if prisoners were protected by the FLSA, family members 
would benefit from no longer having to pay the costs and fees associated with im-
prisonment. Inmates are in the exact position where wage protections are needed 
because, in some cases, it is more expensive to be imprisoned than to be living in 
the community.149 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
It has been demonstrated above that the Jacksons of the world work incredibly 
hard jobs in prison.150 The Jacksons of the world may work six days a week, start 
their days at 3:30 a.m., pay for their own imprisonment, and receive nothing in re-
turn.151 The law has condoned re-enslavement of millions of Americans under the 
Thirteenth Amendment via prison employment, some of whom are actually picking 
cotton.152 And when the legal interpretation is challenged, courts have continued to 
condone free inmate work by reading out of the FLSA the protection of inmates.153 
Inmates contribute to the national economy, so much so that there are lobbying 
groups, like ALEC, working hard to ensure that laws are strict enough to keep prison 
beds full.154 The Hale court said inmates should not be protected under the FLSA 
because the FLSA was, in part, created to alleviate the pains of poverty due to low 
wages.155 However, inmates — despite having food, shelter, and clothing provided 
by the prison — still feel the pains of poverty because their families must step in to 
fill the gap of prison-associated costs.156 Although inmates have certain basic needs 
met, their families struggle to pay their fees, and when inmates leave prison, they 
are debt-saddled. The FLSA was meant to address the collateral harms of low-
wages. Courts should look at these collateral harms and retool its interpretation of 
the economic reality of prison workers. If the law requires the Jacksons of the world 
to work, it should at least give them the same rights that many other workers receive. 
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